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Abstract 
The President has the power to negotiate and ratify treaties on behalf of his country.  However in Nigeria and 
most other countries that operate the dualist system, no treaty between the federation and any other country shall 
become enforceable unless it is domesticated through a legislative enactment.  Therefore treaty-making is purely 
an executive act which requires subsequent legislative intervention for implementation of the treaty in national 
courts.  This article examines the treaty-making power of the Nigerian President and the justification for the 
requirement of domestication of treaties.  The difficulties posed by the requirement of domestication are also 
examined.  Notwithstanding that Nigeria has ratified several international treaties, the domestication of these 
instruments is lamentably slow.  Though this may prevent the implementation or enforcement of these treaties 
within the national courts, they non- the less remain binding on the country at the international level with some 
negative consequences.  The article also examines the impact of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (Third Alteration Act) 2010 on treaty implementation in Nigeria and proffers suggestions on how the 
desired synergy between the executive and the legislature with regard to treaty-making and implementation 
could be achieved. 
Keywords: Treaty, Domestication, Constitution, President, National Assembly. 
  
1. Introduction 
International transactions are normally carried out through treaties.1  Nchi2 defines a treaty as an agreement 
under international law between two or more sovereign States to do or forebear to do a thing.   The Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties3 refers to treaty within the meaning of “an international agreement concluded 
between States in written form and governed by International Law.”  However, international customary law does 
not prescribe the form of treaties, for a treaty may in fact be oral.4  Treaties can cover almost any subject matter, 
and every State is competent to enter into treaties regarding matters that fall within its sovereignty.5   
Nigeria has entered into and ratified so many international treaties.  However most of these ratified 
treaties cannot be enforced within the country because they have not been domesticated as prescribed under the 
1999 Constitution of Nigeria. 
This article examines the treaty-making powers of the President and the rationale for the constitutional 
requirement of domestication before implementation of ratified treaties in Nigeria.  The status of domesticated 
treaties vis-à-vis municipal laws and the effect of non-domestication of treaties in Nigeria are also examined.    
Finally, the impact of the recent amendment of the Nigerian Constitution by the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Third Alteration Act) 2010, relating to treaty implementation in Nigeria is also examined. 
 
2. The President’s Treaty-making Power in Nigeria 
It is important to state from the outset that in Nigeria, treaty-making as opposed to treaty implementation is 
purely an executive function. This is consistent with the position in most legal systems, where the Chief 
Executive or Head of Government, is given the authority, expressly or impliedly to enter into international 
treaties on behalf of the nation.6  However, unlike the American Constitution,7 the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, 
like its predecessors, does not expressly grant to the President, the authority to enter into treaties. The source of 
                                                          
1
    Treaties are called by different names, such as Convention, Protocol, Declaration, Charter, Covenant, Pact, Act, Statute, 
Agreement, Concordat, Modus Vivendi, Exchange of Notes (or Letters), Process Verbal, Final Act and General Act etc.  
See I.O. Umozurike, Introduction to International Law (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Ltd., 2005) p. 163 quoting from S. 
Rossene “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties” in Bernhadt (ed) Encyclopaedia of International Law (1984) Vol. 
9 at 525 – 533. 
2
     S.I. Nchi, Separation of Power under the Nigerian Constitution (Jos: Greenworld Publishing Co. Ltd., 2000) p. 143. 
3
     Signed on 23rd May 1969 and came into force on 27th January, 1980. 
4
     See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Denmark v France) ICJ (1933) Ser A/B N0. 53; Nuclear Tests Case, (Australia v 
France) ICJ Rep. (1974) 253, (New Zealand v France) ICJ. Rep. (1974) 457. 
5
     The Kimbledon case 192.3, pci 8 series A N0. 1. 
6
     K.M. Mowoe, Constitutional Law in Nigeria (Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd., 2003) p. 134. 
7
    US Constitution, Art II section 2 provides that: The President shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate to enter into treaties, provided two thirds of the Senate present concur. 
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the President’s treaty-making power is therefore deduced from certain provisions of the Constitution, 
Conventions and other statutes.  For example, in section 135 of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution, the President, as 
Chief Executive of the Federal Government, is designated Head of State; and in that capacity, he represents the 
country in the totality of its international relations, with the consequence that all his legally relevant international 
acts are considered to be acts of his State.1   
It is also significant to note that by section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, a treaty is made 
between the Federation and any other country.2  The term “Federation” is defined as the “Federal Republic of 
“Nigeria” in section 318 of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.  Whenever that term is used, even though it 
generally includes all the arms of the Federal Government, it particularly refers to the President or the Chief 
Executive as the representative of that Government.3  
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also specifies the persons who are eligible to represent a 
State in the making of Treaties.  Thus, Article 7 of the said Convention provides as follows: 
1. A person is considered as representing a state for the purpose of adopting or authenticating the text of a 
treaty or for the purpose of expressing the consent of the state to be bound by a treaty if: 
(a) He produces appropriate full powers; or 
(b)  It appears from the practice of the states concerned or from other circumstances that their 
intention was to consider that person as representing the state for such purposes and to 
dispense with full powers.  
2. In virtue of their functions and without having to produce full powers, the following are considered as 
representing their state. 
(a) Head of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for foreign Affairs, for the purpose of 
performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. 
(b) Heads of diplomatic missions, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty between the 
accrediting State to which they are accredited. 
(c) Representative accredited by states to an international conference or to an international 
organization or one of its organs, for the purpose of adopting the text of a treaty in that 
conference, organisation or organ. 
From the foregoing, the President of Nigeria is vested with the power to negotiate and ratify treaties 
between Nigeria and other countries.  He also has the power to appoint ambassadors and receive foreign 
dignitaries.  Therefore, subject to certain constitutional restraints, the President has exclusive responsibility for 
negotiating, ratifying and terminating treaties and other agreements between Nigeria and other countries.    In 
practice, this power is usually delegated to certain public officials in relevant government Ministries such as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Justice.4   
 
3. Domestication of Treaties in Nigeria and Effects 
3.1 Domestication of Treaties 
Section 12(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, provides for domestication of treaties 
entered into between Nigeria and other countries, in terms as follows: “No treaty between the Federation and any 
other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law 
by the National Assembly”.  Thus, under section 12 of the said Constitution, even where the President has 
entered into or ratified a treaty, it does not automatically become enforceable in the Nigerian courts; and cannot 
overrule or become superior to municipal laws.  The treaty must be enacted into law by the National Assembly 
through the normal process of legislation and thereafter presented to the President for assent.  This procedure is 
generally referred to as domestication of treaties, which reflects the inherited common law position that treaty-
making is a purely executive act that requires subsequent implementation within the country by way of 
legislation enacted by the legislature.5   
Since a treaty can deal with various subject matters which may sometimes be outside the express 
authority of the Legislature, the Constitution allows the National Assembly to enact into law, treaties relating to 
                                                          
1
     B.O. Nwabueze, The Presidential Constitution of Nigeria (London: C. Hurst & Company (Publishers) Ltd., 1982) p. 254. 
2
    See also Treaties (Making Procedure Etc) Act, Cap T 20 LFN 2010, which is an Act to provide, among other things, for 
treaty-making procedure and the designation of the Federal Ministry of Justice as depository of all treaties entered into 
between the Federation and any other country. 
3
    Nwabueze, Op. Cit. p. 135. 
4
  See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (CFRN) 1999 s. 5(2) empowering the President to exercise executive 
powers either directly or through the Vice President and Ministers of Government of the Federation or Officers in the 
Public Service the Federation. 
5
   B.O. Nwabueze, Federalism in Nigeria Under the Presidential Constitution (Lagos: Lagos State Ministry of Justice, 1983) 
pp. 225 – 226. 
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matters not included in the Legislative lists1 and therefore within the residual legislative powers of the state.   In 
such cases, the bill passed by the National Assembly shall not be presented to the President for assent unless it is 
ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation.2    Therefore domestication connotes the 
enactment of the provisions or contents of an instrument as part of municipal laws either wholly or party.3 
 The rationale for domestication of treaties before they could be enforced by the national Courts is 
primarily predicated on the prohibition of executive law making under the doctrine of separation of powers.  
Since treaties are negotiated and ratified by the executive, which is not the traditional law-making organ, such 
treaties cannot have the force of applicable law, unless they are properly enacted as law by the traditional law-
making organ-the legislature.  This situation is peculiar to countries that operate the Dualist system, which 
regards international law and national law as two different systems, having different natures and characters; and 
maintains that for international law to be applied by the domestic courts it must be incorporated or transformed 
into the domestic system.4 With particular reference to Nigeria, Egede submits that:  
Nigeria operates a dualist system, whereby treaties, including those dealing with human 
rights, cannot be applied domestically unless they have been incorporated through 
domestic legislation.  Although not specifically stated in the Constitution, the practice in 
Nigeria, similar to that of the United Kingdom, is that the executive arm of central 
government has the exclusive power to enter into an international treaty.  For the treaty to 
be enforceable in Nigeria, under section 12(1) of the 1999 Constitution, it must be enacted 
as law by the legislative arm of central government.5  
  The legal position in Nigeria is similar to that of Ghana6 but different from that of America and other 
countries7 where treaties are self-executing and when duly ratified, they automatically form part of the law of the 
land.8   
On the other hand, the Monist system maintains that international law and municipal law are part of the 
same system of norms.9  Thus, in monist States, some treaties have the status of law in the domestic legal 
system, even in the absence of implementing legislation.10 
Commenting on the position under the Namibian Constitution, Ruppel11 had this to say: 
Besides policy-making, the executive is responsible for negotiating and signing 
international agreements, which according to article 144 of the Constitution, form part of 
the Law of Namibia…. The Constitution explicitly incorporates international law and 
makes it part of the law of Namibia.  No transformation or subsequent legislative act is 
needed.  However, international law has to conform with the provisions of the 
Constitution in order to apply domestically.  In case a treaty provision or other rule of 
international law is inconsistent with the Constitution, the later will prevail.  A treaty will 
be binding upon Namibia in terms of Article 144 of the Constitution if the relevant 
                                                          
1
   CFRN, 1999 Nig.. s. 12(2).  See also Lawson (Adeyinka) v Lawson (1984) 5 NCLR 576 HC Lagos. 
2
  Ibid., s. 12(3). 
3
  A.I. Abdu, “Domestic Implementation of International Instruments for Combating Terrorist Financing and Money 
Laundering in Nigeria”, (2014) (2)(3) International Journal of Business and Law Research p. 10.  
4
  I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 31 – 33.  See also 
A. Glashausser, “Treaties as Domestic Law in the United States” in R.A. Miller and R.M. Bratspies, Progress in 
International Law (Lei Den Boston: Martines NIJHOFF ublishers, 2008) pp. 220. 
5
    E. Egede, “Bringing Human Rights Home: An Examination of the Domestication of Human Rights Treaties in Nigeria” 
(2007) (51) (2) Journal of African Law 249 – 284, 250.  
6
   See 1992 Ghana Const., art 75(2).  See also A Kodzo Paaku Kludze, “Constitutional Rights and Their Relationship with 
International Human Rights in Ghana” in (2008) 41 Isr. L. Rev. 677 – 702,  available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1333634.  accessed 14/6/2015. 
7
   They include Belgium, Germany, Luxemburg, The Netherlands,Turkey and Namibia, among others. 
8
    U.S. Const., art. VI, s. 2 (“The Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made pursuant thereof; and 
all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the 
Land, and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby…”).  
9
   Ibid. 
10
 See D. Sloss, “Domestic Application of Treaties” (2011) available at http://digitalcommans.law.scu.edu/facpubs/635.  
accessed on 14/6/2015. 
11
  O.C. Ruppel, “The Role of the Executive in Safeguarding the Independence of the Judiciary in Namibia”, being a paper 
originally presented at the Conference on the independence of the judiciary in sub-Sahara Africa: Towards an 
Independent and Effective Judiciary in Africa, organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s Rule of Law Programme 
for Sub-Sahara Africa, held at Imperial Beach Hotel, Entebbe Uganda 24 – 28 June 2008, available at 
www.kas.de/upload/auslandshomepages/namibia/.../ruppel.pdf.  See also O. Tshosa, National Law and International 
Human Rights Law: Cases of Botsivana, Namibia and Zimbabwe (2001) . 79; G. Erasmus, “The Namibian Constitution 
and the Application of International Law in Namibia” in Van Wyk, D.M. Wiechers & R. Hill eds. Constitutional and 
International Law Issues  (1991) . 94. 
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international and constitutional requirements have been met. 
 
The requirement of domestication also serves as a veritable mechanism for checking and restraining the 
exercise of presidential treaty-making and foreign affairs powers.  Thus, while it is only the President, as the sole 
organ of the nation in foreign relations, who can negotiate and enter into treaty with other nations on behalf of 
his country, no treaty so negotiated and entered into between the Federation and another country or other 
countries shall have the force of law, unless it is enacted as a law by the National Assembly.1   The legislature 
therefore sees the domestication process as a means of checking the activities of the executive; apparently, 
because law-making function is that of the legislature and not that of the executive.2 
In Abacha v Fawehinmi, 3  the Supreme Court of Nigeria in interpreting section 12 of the 1999 
Constitution which requires domestication of treaties stated that: “An international treaty entered into by the 
Government of Nigeria does not become binding until enacted into law by the National Assembly, an 
international treaty has no such force of law as to make its provisions justiciable in our courts”.  
 In the case of Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of 
Nigeria & Ors v Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria,4 the Supreme Court of Nigeria further stressed 
the precondition of domestication of an international treaty in accordance with section 12 of the Constitution 
before it could be enforced in Nigerian courts.  The apex court, therefore, denied the justiciability of clauses 87 
and 98 of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention for non compliance with the provisions of 
section 12(1) of the Constitution.  Although the court conceded that Nigeria was a state party of ILO, it rejected 
the argument that its Conventions were applicable by virtue of a contextual link with cognate provisions under 
the Municipal Trade Union Acts and Article 10 of the African Charter.  The Supreme Court strenuously asserted 
that section 12(1) was a necessary pre-condition and the courts must not look beyond the periphery or precinct of 
the law to interpret it.5   
 An important constitutional development that has recently taken place in Nigeria is the enactment of the 
Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (Alteration Act) 2010 which deals with the status, powers and 
jurisdiction of the National Industrial court.  The Act introduced section 254(c)(2) into the 1999 Nigerian 
Constitution and provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding any thing to the contrary contained in this Constitution, the National 
Industrial Court shall have the jurisdiction and power to deal with any matter connected 
with or pertaining to the application of any international convention treaty or protocol of 
which Nigeria has ratified relating to labour employment, workplace, industrial relations 
or matters connected therewith. 
 The above provision has effectively rendered the procedure for domestication of treaties in section 
12(1)(2) of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria inapplicable to international labour conventions and treaties that 
have been ratified by Nigeira.  The National Industrial Court is therefore empowered to enforce such 
international labour conventions and treaties directly without the necessity of a further legislative enactment for 
domestic application thereof, provided that they have been ratified by the President on behalf of the country. 
 In the light of this constitutional development, it is obvious that the case of Registered Trusties of 
National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria & Ors v Medical and Health Workers of 
Nigeria and similar cases would be decided differently today.6  In the same vein, the pronouncements of the 
justices of the Supreme Court in Abacha v Fawehinmi7 on the imperativeness of domestication of treaties in 
Nigeria before they could be enforced locally, no longer apply to international labour conventions or treaties, 
ratified by the country.   
 
3.2 Status of Domesticated Treaties in Relation to Municipal Laws  
The status of a duly domesticated treaty in relation to municipal laws is dealt with variously in every legal 
system despite the existence of various theories8 on what the relationship should be. In Nigeria, once the treaty 
                                                          
1
   CFRN, 1999 s. 12. 
2
   B.I. Olutoyin, “Treaty-Making and its Application under Nigerian Law: The Journey so far”, (2014) 31International 
Journal of Business and Management Invention 31 pp. 7 – 18. 
3
    (2000) 77 LRCN 1261 – 1262. 
4
    (2008) 2 NWLR (Pt. 1072) 575. 
5
   Ibid. at 622. 
6
   See B, Atilola, National Industrial Court and Jurisdiction over International Labour Treaties under the Third Alteration Act, 
available at nicn.gov.ng/publications… accessed  on 8/11/2014.  
7
   Supra  
8
  For example, the Monist theory believes that both international and municipal laws belong to a unified science that 
transcend national boundaries in that they apply to same subjects.  In case of conflict, most monist would give primacy 
to international law, whilst a few would given primacy to municipal law.  Another is the dualist theory which believes 
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has been domesticated, the courts will generally not construe a municipal law in such a way as to bring it into 
conflict with the treaty.  In Abacha v Fawehinmi,1 Uwaifor JSC aptly stated the position of Nigerian courts with 
respect to the relationship between municipal laws and its jurisprudential acknowledgment of international law 
when he said that: “There exists a presumption that a statute will not be interpreted so as to violate the rule of 
international law”.2 
   Thus, in Oshevire v British Caledonian Airways Ltd.,3 the court applied and gave effect to the Warsaw 
Convention of 1929.  Similarly, in Ibidapo v Lufthansa Airlines,4 the Supreme Court upheld the applicability of 
the Warsaw Convention in Nigeria even though it was omitted from the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990. 
Wali JSC affirmed that Nigeria, like any other Commonwealth country, inherited the English common law rules 
governing the municipal application of international law.5  In United African Company (UAC) Nig. Ltd. v Global 
Transport,6 the Court of Appeal gave effect to the Hague Visby Rules.  In all those cases the treaties were given 
precedence over municipal laws. 
 In relation to the application of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights which was re-
enacted into our laws under military rule,7 the courts have held that the provisions of the Charter are applicable, 
and that the jurisdiction of the courts cannot be ousted in relation to them, by a decree of constitutional 
dimension, which, under military rule, is supreme.  Thus, for example, in Fawehinmi v Abacha,8 the Court of 
Appeal and Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the jurisdiction of the courts in relation to the application 
of an international law cannot be ousted by municipal law.  The Supreme Court in Fawehinmi v Abacha made it 
clear, however, that such international law or treaty can only be superior to other laws and not the Constitution. 
 
4. The President’s Treaty-making Power under the American Constitution 
In the United States, the President is the sole organ of the Nation in external relations and its sole representative 
with foreign Nations.9  This assertion received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in United States v Curtiss – 
Wright Export Corp.10 where Southerland J. stated as follows: 
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the 
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate 
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the 
field of international relations – a power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an 
act of congress, but which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised 
in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. 
 The President’s power in treaty-making and foreign relations is expressly ordained in Article II, 
sections 1 and 2 of the American Constitution which provide as follows:  
 Article II section 1: 
  The President shall receive Ambassadors and other Public Ministers. 
 Article 11 section 2: 
The President shall have power by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to enter into 
treaties provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur, and he shall nominate and by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other Public Ministers 
and Consuls. 
 From the above provisions, it is clear that unlike the system operating in Nigeria, the American 
Constitution involves both the President and the Senate in treaty-making or ratification process.11  Pyle and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
that both laws are separate and self-contained.  In conflict each has primacy within its domain.  In practice most nations 
have their own theories about the applicability and status of international law.  
1
   (2000) NWLR (Pt. 660) 228. 
2
   Ibid. at 345. 
3
  (1990) 7 NWLR, (Pt. 163) 489. 
4
  (1997) 4 NWLR, (Pt. 498) 124. 
5
  Ibid. at 150. 
6
  (1996) 5 NWLR, (Pt. 448) 291. 
7
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification & Enactment) Act Cap A 9 Laws of the  Federation of Nigeria, 
2010. 
8
  (2000) 6 NWLR (Pt. 610).  Ogugu v State (1994) NWLR (Pt. 366) 1; Comptroller of Nigerian Prisons v Adekanye (1999) 
10 NWLR (Pt. 663) 424. 
9
  See 10 Annals of Cong. 596, 613 – 614 (1800), Per John Marshall, see also S.B. Prakash and M.D. Ramsey, “The 
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs” (2001) 111 Yale L. J. 235. 
10
   299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
11
   L. Fisher, Constitutional Conflict Between Congress and the President (Lawrence: University of Kansas ress, 2007) 
(noting that from the language of art. 11 section 2 of the Constitution treaty making appears to be done jointly between 
the two branches, executive and congress). 
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Pious,1  assert that the President’s authority to make treaties has come to mean the power to negotiate them, to 
submit them to the Senate, and, if the Senate consents, to make the final decision whether to ratify them on 
behalf of the United States.  However, the President’s exclusive right to negotiate treaties has always been 
recognized.  Senate cannot intrude into the field of negotiation, and, indeed, the Congress is powerless to 
invade.2  However, in practice, Presidents, in negotiating treaties, retain the discretion to confide in or ignore the 
Senate as they deem appropriate and sometimes Presidents solicit advice from the Senate; save on occasions 
when it places a reservation3 on a negotiated treaty.4  The Senate retains the right to reject the product of any 
negotiations that it finds objectionable, irrespective of whether the President kept it informed of treaty 
negotiations or only key members of the Senate were informed.5  The requirement of Senate consent does 
provide a check on the President’s power, and an opportunity for sober second thought.6  
   Generally, under Article VI(2) of the American Constitution a treaty is declared as part of the laws of 
the land.  Thus, where the treaty is self-executory, it becomes automatically operational after due ratification.  In 
other cases where it is in the form of a contract, it requires the legislative act of the Senate to make it 
operational.7 
The actual conduct of foreign affairs, including negotiation of treaties with other nations, is a presidential 
monopoly.  However, the ultimate power to prescribe the substantive terms of American policy, both foreign and 
domestic, is, generally, the prerogative of Congress.8   
 
5. Challenges to Domestication of Treaties in Nigeria 
Unfortunately, in Nigeria and other African countries that operate the dualist system, the pace of domestication 
of treaties is rather slow and this has resulted in the non-applicability of many ratified treaties in national courts.9  
Notwithstanding that Nigeria is a party to several international and regional human rights instruments by 
signature, ratification, accession or succession, the domestication of these instruments is lamentably slow.  
Nigeria has taken no action whatsoever in respect of some international human rights treaties.10 
 Some of the challenges to the smooth domestication of treaties in Nigeria include the failure of relevant 
Federal Ministries to consult the Federal Ministry of Justice regarding the signing of international agreements; 
the lack of adequate liaison between the Presidency and the Federal Ministry of Justice regarding the signing of 
international agreements and the National Assembly’s lack of interest in the quick domestication of treaties that 
have been ratified.11 In order to address these challenges, it has been recommended that the relevant Ministries 
and Agencies of the executive branch should priorities all ratified treaties for domestication based on the 
importance of the treaties to improve the lives of Nigerians and the ease with which the domestication 
legislation would pass through the legislature.12 
 Indeed, practical experience has proved that it is not easy to have a legislation that domesticates a treaty 
to pass through the legislature in Nigeria.  For example, the Bill which sought to domesticate the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, which Nigeria ratified on 13th June, 1985, is still 
pending before the National Assembly.  However, many other treaties have been domesticated in Nigeria, one of 
which is the treaty establishing the African Union, which, after ratification, was given the force of law in Nigeria 
by the Treaty to Establish the African Union (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, 2003.13   The African Union 
treaty was made a Schedule to the Act.  The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights has not only been 
ratified but also domesticated by the enactment of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
                                                          
1
   C.H. Pyle and R.M. Pious, The President, Congress, and the Constitution (New York: The Free Press, 1984) p. 243. 
2
   See United States v Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) Per Sunderland J. 
3
   The term reservation may refer to a modification of the terms of a treaty by the Senate which then becomes in the nature of 
a counter offer by the United States, or it may be a particular interpretation of the treaty of a statement limiting its 
consequences.  In any event, reservations usually require renegotiation by the President.   
4
   A.S. Miller, Presidential Power (1977) . 138. 
5
   H.J. Krent, Presidential Powers (2005) . 95. 
6
  Miller, Op. Cit. at 142.  On this account Presidents have refused to send to the Senate treaties already negotiated; they have 
withdrawn treaties from the Senate before it acted; they have refused to ratify treaties to which the Senate concurred; 
they have refrained from Pressing for Senate consent to treaties submitted by their predecessors.  See L. Henkin, Foreign 
Affairs and the Constitution (1972) . 133. 
7
    Froster v Nelson, 27 U.S. (2 pet.) 253, 314 (1829) per Marshall, C.J.  
8
    See Miller, Op. Cit. at 132. 
9
   Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second African Regional Conference for Women Judges held in K. Nairobi, on 6 
– 8 August, 2001. 
10
   Ibid. 
11
  Report of Consultative Meeting of the Department of International and Comparative Law of the Federal Ministry of 
Justice held at Abuja on 14 – 15 March, 2006.. 
12
  Ibid. 
13
   Cap. A 9, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
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(Ratification and Enforcement) Act.1 
 
6. Domestication of Treaties and International Obligations of Countries 
It is significant to note that, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes it clear that with 
respect to treaty obligation, a State may not invoke the provision of its internal law as justification for its failure 
to perform a treaty.2  
 Thus, while an undomesticated treaty may not be enforceable by the national courts, it remains binding 
on the Nation at the international level.  In the case of Cameroun v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening,3 one 
of the questions that arose for determination was whether a state like Nigeria would be permitted to rely on 
domestic law to avoid its obligation under a treaty.  This case involved a dispute between Nigeria and Cameroun 
over the land and maritime boundary between them.  Cameroun argued that the Yaounde II Declaration and the 
Maroua Declaration provide a binding definition of the boundary delimiting the respective maritime spaces of 
Cameroun and Nigeria. 
 It was argued also that the signing of the Maroua Agreement by the Heads of State of Nigeria and 
Cameroun on 1 June 1975 expressed the consent of the two States to be bound by that treaty; that they 
manifested their intention to be bound by the instrument they signed; that no reservation or condition was 
expressed in the text and that the instrument was not expressed to be subject to ratification.4   Nigeria on its part 
stressed that Yaounde II Declaration was not a binding agreement but simply represented the record of a 
meeting.5  It was further argued that the Maroua Declaration lacked legal validity, since it was not ratified by the 
Supreme Military Council after being signed by the Nigerian Head of State6 as required under the 1963 Nigerian 
Constitution in force at the relevant time (June 1975).  Accordingly, it was contended that the Agreement was 
subject to ratification. 
 The International Court of Justice inter alia held that: “the court cannot accept that Maroua Declaration 
was invalid under international law because it was signed by the Nigerian Head of State of the time but never 
ratified”.7  While rejecting the argument put forward by Nigeria that its constitutional rules regarding the 
conclusion of treaties were not complied with, the court referred to article 46, paragraph 1 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties which provides that: “(a) State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been express in violation of a provision of its international law of fundamental 
importance”.8 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a country would not deliberately jettison the imperatives of its 
constitutional provisions in favour of implementing an undomesticated treaty.  Thus, the provision of section 
12(1) of the Nigerian Constitution has continued to constitute a clog in the process of direct application of 
treaties, with the embarrassing consequence of the President having to ratify a treaty on behalf of his country 
without the country honouring its obligations under the said treaty by implementing its provisions because the 
National Assembly has failed  or refused to enact the requisite legislation.  Romola9 still insists that courts in any 
civil society, by virtue of their pertinent role within the system, cannot afford to disregard the obligation of 
States with respect to international law.  It is also pertinent to stress that the enforcement of an undomesticated 
treaty by the courts in its effort to uphold State obligation under the treaty would most likely result in the 
violation of the Constitution as the Supreme law of the land.   A balance must be struck to address the situation 
and some suggestions are proffered below in this regard. 
 
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 
From the foregoing, it is clear that legislative control of the President’s treaty- making power is indirect as it 
consists of the failure or refusal, by the legislature, to enact the necessary legislation for the implementation of 
treaties that have been ratified by the President.  The knowledge that the legislature may refuse to enact the 
implementing legislation should hopefully guide the President in the negotiation and ratification of treaties, and 
prevent him from entering into international treaties and agreements that may be harmful to the national interest 
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   Cap. A 10, Laws of the Federation of Nigeria, 2010. 
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  A. Romola, “International Law in Nigerian Courts: Circumventing the Firewall of Domestication Before Application,” 
available at http://www.chr.up.ac.za/centre-projects/ildc/papers-2009/Romola.doc., accessed 12/11/2014. 
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in the long run.  Legislative checks on treaty-making and foreign affairs powers of the President1 are therefore 
necessary to ensure that decisions and agreements made with foreign countries are beneficial to, and in the best 
interest of, the country.   However, it is certain that the failure by the Nigerian legislature to enact the relevant 
legislation to domestication a ratified treaty may not arise from its deliberate effort to restrain and check the 
treaty-making power of the executive.  Other reasons may be responsible for the failure; one of which may be 
sheer abdication by the legislature of its constitutional responsibility.  Indeed, the slow pace of domestication of 
ratified treaties recorded by the Nigerian National Assembly is a clear indication that the National Assembly 
does not give priority attention to this responsibility.  The Nigerian legislature must therefore wake up from 
slumber and discharge its constitutional responsibilities diligently with respect to the domestication of treaties 
duly ratified by the executive.  All administrative bureaucracies and bottlenecks must be removed to ensure 
proper communication and liaison between the relevant executive departments and the National Assembly.   
   It is also been shown that the requirement of domestication can create the unhealthy situation where a 
treaty duly ratified by the President, and, therefore, binding on the nation at the international level is 
unenforceable locally because it is not domesticated.  In such situations, the country would still be bound to 
honour its international obligation as it is not allowed to invoke the provision of its internal law as justification 
for its failure to perform the treaty.  In order to avoid these unhealthy and embarrassing situations, the 
involvement of the legislature in the ratification process of some treaties is strongly recommended.2  By this 
arrangement, the National Assembly would be afforded the opportunity to scrutinize the proposed treaty and 
give its consent by way of a resolution before it is ratified by the executive.  This however, would not obviate 
the necessity for subsequent domestication of the ratified treaty by the legislature but would greatly enhance and 
facilitate the process since the legislature had earlier supported its ratification.   
 It is also important to stress that the strict classification of countries into monist and dualist nations is 
no longer realistic and tenable in contemporary international law jurisprudence.  The amendment of the Nigerian 
Constitution which empowers the National Industrial Court to invoke the provisions of any international labour 
treaty or convention to which Nigeria has ratified, notwithstanding that such instruments have not been 
domesticated, lends credence to this assertion.  The practical effect of this constitutional amendment is that 
labour law treaties and conventions, ratified by Nigeria, could be enforced nationally, even though they are not 
expressly domesticated in accordance with the procedure stipulated under section 12(1) of the 1999 
Constitution.  We believe that this is a welcome development, which should be extended to treaties and 
conventions on other areas of international law; particularly those on Human Rights.   Indeed the strict 
adherence to the monist and dualist classification is gradually being jettisoned in favour of a hybrid situation.  
Thus, a country’s Constitution can contain both monist and dualist elements.3   
The South African constitutional position, by which certain treaties require domestication, while others 
are self executing, and, therefore, come into force without any legislative approval/domestication,4 seems to 
address the situation properly, and, therefore, recommended for Nigeria. 
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